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Abstract
This article seeks to clarify the political activities of a variety of Tibetan groups 
and leaders during the 1911 Revolution. After the collapse of the Qing dynasty, 
China planned to incorporate Tibet and Mongolia into Chinese territory by 
declaring the “the Republic of Five Races”. In opposition to this, the Dalai Lama 
Government attempted to achieve full independence as the country integrating all 
areas in which Tibetan people lived. During this process, the question of political 
status of Tibet and a border dispute between Tibet and China arose. This territorial 
issue developed into a controversial topic at the Simla conference between Tibet, 
China and Britain in 1913-1914. However, the political attitudes of the indigenous 
leaders and the Tibetan Buddhist priest, who living in the Tibetan border areas of 
Kham and Amdo, were quite varied. Their political activities were not dependent 
on their agreement with the principle of the “the Republic of Five Races” or 
Tibetan Nationalism. Thus more attention should be given to the historical 
relationships to both the Chinese and Dalai Lama governments that were built 
during the Qing period. 
Keywords:
The territorial issue of Tibet, “the Republic of Five Races” (Wuzu Gonghe), The 
Simla conference, the Dalai Lama’s government, The Tibetan indigenous leaders 
in Kham, “The Nnative Chieftains” (Tusi), The incarnations in Amdo
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Introduction
During the second decade of the 20th century, The Dalai Lama’s government 
in Tibet and Bogd Khaan’s government in Mongolia had both been trying to 
reconsider their relationship with China. Yet, Dalai Lama’s government followed a 
different path from that of Bogd Khaan’s Mongolia. The Kiakhta Conference (1914 
- 1915) among Russia, Mongolia and China concluded an agreement regarding 
Bogd Khaan government’s “autonomy” and its range of application (regarding the 
outer Mongolia), which later set the basic parameter of the independent Mongolian 
territory. In contrast, the Simla Conference (1913 - 1914) among the Britain, 
Tibet and China failed to establish a borderline between the territory of the Dalai 
Lama’s government and China proper.1 In other words, the hard question of the 
exact territory of Tibet (which was to be politically integrated) eventually derailed 
the negotiation. The Dalai Lama’s government remained in power both politically 
and diplomatically throughout the first half of the 20th century. However, without 
clear international recognitions of its political status, Tibet was to be annexed 
to PRC. The Simla Conference was a starting point for the complicated Sino-
Tibet history in the modern and contemporary era. Thus, it would be important to 
consider how the territorial issue of Tibet came under dispute at the first place. 
The 1911 Revolution era was not only a period when many debates and 
confrontations about the framework of “China” emerged to the forefront.2 The 
definition of the Tibetan territory also became a focal point in the international 
political arena. Previous studies on the early 20th century Tibet has mainly 
centered around the political status of the Dalai Lama’s government and its 
diplomacy in the international community.3 As an important subject of this article, 
1 For the diverging fate of Tibet and Mongolia, see Tatsuo Nakami’s argument from the per-
spective of international politics, “Mongoru chibetto” [Mongolia and Tibet] in Hisao Komatsu 
ed., Chuo yurashia shi [The history of central Eurasia] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan sha, 2002). 
2 Yujiro Murata. “Chuka minzoku ron no keifu” [The genealogy of the Chinese nation], in 
Wataru Iijima et al eds., Shirizu 20 seiki chugoku shi 1: Chuka sekai to gendai [Collected 
volume of the 20th century Chinese history 1: Qing China and the Modern World] (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 2009). 
3 For the relationship with British policies, see: Alastair Lamb. The McMahon Line: A Study 
in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1966), 571; Mehra, P. The McMahon Line and After: A Study of the Triangular Contest 
on India’s North-eastern Frontier Between Britain,China and Tibet, 1904-1947 (Delhi: 
Macmillan, 1974). Other works on modern Tibet include: Shakabpa, W.D. Bod kyi srid don rg-
yal rabs, Tsepal Taikhang, 1976; Goldstein, M. C. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: the 
Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). For a detailed 
account of the 13th Dalai Lama, sNar skyid ngag dbang don grub, Gong sa skyabs mgon rgyal 
dbang sku ‘phreng bcu gsum pa chen po’i mdzad rnam snying btus, Library of Tibetan Works 
& Archives, 2008.
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the Dalai Lama’s government played a central role in bringing Tibet to the modern 
international society. Then Tibet, though, lacked a centralized political entity 
overseeing the entire territory. In addition to the Dalai Lama’s government based 
at Lhasa, there were many Tibetan polities in the border areas next to the Han 
area (Tibetan areas, referred to “Kham” and “Amdo” in Tibetan, ranging across 
Sichuan, Yun’nan, Qinghai and Gansu).4 Unlike the Dalai Lama’s government, 
they were not key players of the Tibetan foreign policy. Yet, the main agenda 
in Simla Conference was precisely about territories under these polities in the 
borderlands. Therefore, it is important to analyze the changing relationship 
between them, the Dalai Lama’s government, and China. 
This paper uses the term “Tibet” rather loosely, precisely because of this 
attention to these different polities in Tibet. This paper fucuses on the polities 
in the Tibetan borderlands other than the Dalai Lama’s government in Tibet, it 
aims to provide a multilayered description of how “Tibet” adapted to the process 
of Qing’s demise in the period of 1911 Revolution. In addition, it would try to 
elaborate on the complicated bilateral relationship between “China” and “Tibet” 
and the factors that contributed to the complexity, which may not be easily shown 
through the analysis of the diplomatic negotiation process of the borderline 
delineation. This approach would help us understand the process of how the 
boundary problem came to existence. 
1. Tibet during the 1911 Revolution : 
　Focused on the Dalai Lama’s Government 
First, by mainly focusing on the policy direction of the Dalai Lama’s government, 
I would like to offer a general picture of the situation that Tibet was facing during 
the 1911 Revolution period. The Dalai Lama’s government mainly consisted of 
the Gelug, one sect of the Tibetan Buddhism. It was established in 1642 at central 
Tibet with military support from Güshi Khaan—the head of the Khoshut khanate 
of the western Mongolia Oirat. The government had built bilateral relationship 
with the Qing Dynasty during the mid of the 17th century. Qing was a Manchurian 
regime flourished from the northeastern side of the Eurasian continent. It was 
extremely careful to keep the Mongolians at its side, while it expanded. In order 
to strengthen the ties with them, Qing’s emperors showed their deference to Dalai 
Lama’s authority in Mongolia where Tibetan Buddhism had strong influence. 
4 Regarding the traditional Tibet region: Samuel, G. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan 
Societies (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).
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They protected Buddhism there. Dalai Lama in return venerated the Qing 
emperors as the incarnation of Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, as well as the patrons of 
Tibetan Buddhism. 
The bilateral relationship between the two sides had been fairly well until the 
18th century. However, it quickly deteriorated after the second half of the 19th 
century. Related research in today’s China often sees the competition between the 
Britain and Russia in Inner Asia as the definitive factor that caused the changes 
of the relationship. “Imperialists invasion to Tibet” tends to be the answer.5 
However, the major interest of the British engagement in Tibet was commercial 
and security concerns for its protectorate – India, not domination of Tibet. This 
is clear from the fact that the British policy toward Tibet since the second half 
of the 19th century was premised on its recognition of Qing as a suzerain state 
of Tibet. Recent research in contrast emphasizes that the tension between the 
Dalai Lama’s government and Qing was due to 1) the structural changes of Qing 
including the rise of the Han bureaucrats; 2) the development of the recognition 
of the “sovereignty” toward Tibet among Qing elites; and 3) coercive policies 
against Tibet in later years.6 Indeed, Zhao Erfeng, the Border Commissioner for 
Sichuan and Yunnan, or Chuandian Bianwu Dachen et al’s Eastern Tibet Reform 
during the era of the New Policies (Xinzheng) at the beginning of 20th century 
entailed crackdowns of the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, which caused strong 
repercussions from the Dalai Lama’s government. The 13th Dalai Lama’s distrust 
against the Qing peaked, as the Sichuan Army invaded Lhasa in February 1910, 
forcing him to exile to British India. As the 1911 Revolution unfolds, the Sichuan 
Army and the Tibet Army fought against each other. However, with the defeat and 
surrender of the Sichuan Army by the end of 1912, The 13th Dalai Lama was able 
to return to Lhasa in January next year. Thus, the bilateral relationship was already 
at the brink of collapse before the revolution. It was Qing’s policy instead of the 
British intrigue that directly brought up the situation.7
How did the Dalai Lama’s government perceive its relationship with the Qing 
Dynasty and the Republic of China? The policies of Dalai Lama and Bogd Khaan 
government have often been interpreted as a process for the countries and peoples, 
once integrated to the Qing’s territory as Fanbu (Dependencies or Vassals), to seek 
5 For example, Zhou Weizhou. Ying’guo, eguo yu zhongguo xiang [The UK, Russia and 
Chinese Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2000). 
6 Satoshi Hirano. “Chibetto wo meguru kokusai kankei to kindaika no konmei” [The chaotic 
international relations and modernization regarding Tibet] in Zhao Jingda ed., Iwanami kouza 
higashi ajia kin gendai tsuushi 3 [Iwanami lecture series: modern and contemporary history of 
East Asia 3] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010).
7 Regarding the background, see Ryosuke Kobayashi. “1910 nen zengo no chibetto: Shisen gun 
no chibetto shingun no shiteki ichi [Tibet in 1910: The Historical Position of Sichuan Army’s 
Expedition against Lhasa],” Rekishi Hyōron [Historical Review] (2010) 725.
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for independence as Qing fell apart.8 However, it is significant that Dalai Lama’s 
government was facing a different situation from that of Bogd Khaan government, 
which had declared independence from Qing and establishment of its own country 
immediately after the Revolution.9
To begin with, the Dalai Lama’s government was not even aware that it was 
under the control of Qing or China. In his letter to England after arriving at Lhasa 
from Darjeeling (where he took refugee at) to Tibet around the beginning of 1913, 
the 13th Dalai Lama wrote, “China and Tibet had long been in a purely Priest/
Patron relationship (rgya bod mchod yon rim ’brel). I have written about the fact 
that Tibet has never been controlled by China”.10 The word “mchod yon” refers 
to the relationship between Dalai Lama as the highest being in Tibet which is the 
center of Tibetan Buddhism, and the Qing emperor who protects Buddhism. The 
13th Dalai Lama never saw his relationship with previous Qing emperors as a lord 
hierarchical one. Obviously, he did not recognize a “China” that encompasses the 
lands of both the Hans and the Tibetans.11
This perception also applies to the Republic of China. The interim President 
Yuan Shikai proclaimed “the Republic of Five Races”, including the Manchurians, 
the Hans, the Mongolians, the Muslims and the Tibetans after the Revolution. He 
also asked the Dalai Lama to participate in the Republic, promising that he would 
return the title that Qing had rescinded during Dalai’s exile in India.12 However, 
The 13th Dalai Lama replies,
After serious consideration you have decided to restore my rank and titles and 
to stop fighting in Tibet, and also to prosper the happiness of the five nations. [I 
must however point out that] when I visited Peking, I wrote to Wang Kun-Sang 
Norpu about Tibet only. I never asked him for any rank or title either there or on 
any subsequent occasion. The real truth is that Tibet is the Priest of China, but 
China, with intent to bring Tibet under subjection, destroyed many monasteries 
8 Yorihisa Namiki, and Hiromasa Inoue, Sekai no rekishi 19: Chuka teikoku no kiki [World his-
tory 19: Crisis of the Chinese empire] (Tokyo: Chuo kouron, 1997), 358-61. 
9 Regarding Bogd Khaan government’s behavior and position over independence, see Tatsuo 
Nakami, “Mongoru no ‘dokuritsu’ to kokusai kankei” [Mongolia’s “independence” and the in-
ternational relations] in Yuzo Mizoguchi ed., Ajia kara kangaeru 3: shuen kara no rekishi [Think 
from Asia 1: History from the periphery] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), 91, 92. 
10 Refer to Tibetan attachment in IOR/L/P&S/11/64, P. 3937.
11 We have to note that historical documents in Tibetan language during this period as listed 
in footnote 10 does not refer “China” as the “Middle Kingdom”. The Tibetan translation for 
“Han” or “China” was “rgya nag”, which refers to regimes controlling the Han territories such 
as Ming, Qing and the Republic. In this word, there is no connotation of cultural superiority/
inferiority or concept of center-periphery between the Hans and the Tibetans.
12 Zhongguo dier lishi dang’an guan suocun Xizang he Zangshi dang’an, Vol. 2, 
China Tibetology Publishing House,2009.(Abbreviate as ZDLDXZ).
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and countries. Now, at the time of the actual withdrawal of the Chinese troops 
(from Tibet), it is not agreeable to the people of Tibet to allow the Chinese and 
Tibetans to combine, after explaining matters which have been in dispute.13
Rejecting Yuan Shikai’s offer, Dalai Lama showed that his authority was 
not conferred from China, and criticized that Qing’s military campaign was a 
unilateral move to change the Priest/Patron relationship to a dominator/dominated 
one. 
The then Dalai Lama’s government was consistent with this stance,14 which 
is clear from the 13th Dalai Lama’s “Independent Declaration” on February 
13, 1913.15 It might be necessary to analyze how the Dalai Lama’s government 
understood the notion of “independence” and how he attempted to situate itself 
in the modern international society. However, this paper is in no position to 
make such comprehensive observations.16 I would argue that the Dalai Lama’s 
government had harbored strong distrust against China since the end of Qing. It 
sought for the power both politically and diplomatically not by maneuver of the 
British government but by its own volition. One of the important tasks for Tibet 
during that process was to exclude Chinese influence by receiving aid from and 
cooperating with Britain.
Meanwhile, the Republic of China did not recognize the Dalai Lama’s 
government and its policy orientations. It attempted to annex Tibet through 
mobilizing the army led by the Sichuan Governor Yin Changheng et al. The 
13 NAI, Foreign Dept. Proceedings, Feb 1913, Secret-External, Nos. 107-509, No. 290 C., 
Dalai Lama to Yuan Shi Kai, Dec. 1912.
14 The forewords of The Mongolia-Tibet Treaty signed at Urga on January 11, 1911 was a 
Tibetan document proving the understanding that Tibet was under control of Manchu. The 
document says, “Our two countries of Mongolia and Tibet achieved independence from 
China by freeing ourselves from the Manchu dominion (rang re bod sog gnyis manyju’i rgyal 
khab gyi mnga’ ’og nas thon rgya nag po dang bral te bod sog so so rgyal khab rang btsan pa 
bgyis)”. However, further studies are needed to confirm whether this understanding was shared 
within the then Dalai Lama’s government. According to Makoto Tachibana, “at least for Bogd 
Khaan, this treaty meant reconciliation with Dalai Lama after a period of antagonism. The 
treaty also strengthened his authority, for it was signed under equal footings with Dalai Lama”. 
This implies that the working-level officials at the negotiation may have intended to compare 
the Qing-Tibet relationship to that between Qing and Mongolia (a hierarchical relationship). 
This might also refer to Tibet’s independence from its temporary subjection to Sichuan Army 
at Lhasa in 1910. These are the points about the Mongolia-Tibet Treaty that need to be clari-
fied in the future. Makoto Tachibana, Bogudo han seiken no kenkyu—mongoru kenkoku shi 
josetsu 1911-1921 [A Study on the Bogd Khaan Government—History of State-Building in 
Mongolia, 1911-1921] (Tokyo: Kazama Shobo, 2011), 115, 116. Refer to the treaty’s original 
text in Tibetan, Batsaikhan, E. O. Bogd Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, The Last King of Mongolia 
(Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2008), 323.
15 Shakabpa, W.D. op. cit., 219-221.
16 We have to carefully analyze the linkage between the terms such as “independence” 
(rang btsan) and “freedom” (rang dbang) and the process of Tibet’s acceptance of modern 
vocabulary. 
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political status of Tibet became a focal point during this period, and a tripartite 
conference was held including Britain at Simla, India in October 1913. 
2. The Tibetan Indigenous Leaders and Monks in 
Border Areas.
 
(1) The Submission to the Dalai Lama’s Government 
What political stances did other Tibetan polities, except the Dalai Lama’s 
government, take during this period? We cannot understand the relationship 
between Tibet and Qing just by looking at the interactions between Dalai Lama 
and the Qing emperor. Many Tibetan indigenous leaders including those powerful 
leaders and kings enjoyed their power bases at the periphery of the Dalai Lama’s 
government, ranging across the border areas (for the simplicity of argument here, I 
would use the term “border area”, though its actual expansion is large) of Qinghai, 
southern Gansu, western Sichuan and northern Yun’nan. Qing granted the most 
of them with official status as Tusi (native chieftains) and allowed their hereditary 
powers. In particular, Eastern Tibet, which was incorporated to Sichuan, was a 
key transportation region linking the lands of the Hans and central Tibet. Many 
indigenous leaders were appointed as Tusi along the major routes, and they 
provided animals and labor to support the transportation of people, goods and 
information. Thus, the indigenous leaders played an important role in connecting 
Qing and the Dalai Lama’s government. 
Although close to the Han territory, the geographical barriers of the Tibetan 
Plateau had made it difficult for the Qing authority to steadily exert its influence 
on Eastern Tibet. Not many Han agricultural migrants were able to enter this 
area until late Qing period when the government began to promote development 
of the region. As I will discuss later, it was not the Hans but the Eastern Tibetan 
merchant network that controlled the indigenous leaders economy by linking Tibet 
to the outside world. Until the end of Qing Dynasty, these Tibetan leaders enjoyed 
extremely autonomous political authorities in their territories. 
Previous research on the reality of Eastern Tibet and the indigenous leaders’ 
policy orientation during the Qing era has focused on Qing’s rule of this region 
through the Tusi system. Similarly regarding the post Qing period, previous 
studies mainly emphasized the process of replacing the indigenous leaders by 
government appointed officials (Gaitu guiliu), such as the dismantlement of 
the Tusi system that Zhao Erfeng carried out as part of the Eastern Tibet reform 
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policy.17
Here it is significant that the Dalai Lama’s government had enjoyed a 
relatively dominant position vis-à-vis other indigenous leaders, regardless of the 
demarcation of the administrative border by Qing. When the indigenous leaders of 
the Nyarong region launched a large-scale campaign in Eastern Tibet to conquer 
other regions in 1865, the Dalai Lama’s government subdued it. As a result, 
Dalai Lama had the Nyarong region and multiple Sichuan Tusis (in particular 
the Derge Kingdom and the five kingdoms of Hor, which had been dominated by 
Nyarong before) under control. This was the beginning of a complicated political 
situation for these indigenous leaders who had to enter a suzerain status vis-à-
vis both the Dalai Lama’s government and the Qing Dynasty. This complication 
in turn had at times caused conflicts between the two big powers.18 Yet, it may 
not be appropriate to grasp the bilateral relationship over Eastern Tibet solely in 
terms of conflict and competition. The Dalai Lama’s government did not attempt 
to foster any exclusive relationship with these indigenous leaders at the first 
place. The Dalai Lama’s government was aware of the fact that these indigenous 
leaders were also within Qing’s sphere of influence as Tusis. Also, the Dalai 
Lama’s government made them promise to fulfill their responsibilities in officials’ 
transportation and commercial activities between the two powers.19 As long as it 
maintained a healthy relationship with Qing, the Dalai Lama’s government did not 
object the idea of overlapping authority and power with Qing in Eastern Tibet. 
Such overlap in Eastern Tibet had to certain extent set the basic parameter for 
tribal leaders’ political orientations during the New Policies era. It is significant 
that some of them resisted the gaitu guiliu policy and exiled to central Tibet 
for Dalai Lama’s protection. According the a report from the Dalai Lama’s 
government to the Indian government, 600 families of the Sertas—a nomad group 
from Eastern Tibet, escaped to Nagchu—a pasture land to the north of central 
Tibet.20 Objecting Qing’s orders to return the official seal and the certificate, 
17 Recent studies include, Yanqin Wu. Qing mo min’guo shiqi chuanzang guanxi yanjiu 
[Research on the relationship between Sichuan and Tibet during the late Qing and Republic 
era] (Kunming: Yun’nan renmin chubanshe, 2007).
18 Ryosuke Kobayashi. “Dalai lama seiken no higashi chibetto shihai 1865—1911: chuzou 
kyoukai mondai keiseino ichi sokumen” [Dalai Lama Government’s Rule of Eastern Tibet 
(1865-1911): History of the Boundary Problems between China and Tibet] Ajia afurika gengo 
bunka kenkyu [Journal of Asian and African Studies] (2008) 76.  
19 Ryosuke Kobayashi. “19 seiki matsu ~ 20 seiki shotou, Dalai lama seiken no higashi chibetto 
shihai to deruge oukoku (dege doshi)” [The Dalai Lama’s government’s rule of Eastern Tibet 
and the Kingdom of Derge (Dege Tusi) during the late 19th to early 20th century] Toyo bunka 
kenkyu [Toyo Culture studies] (2011) 13. 
20 NAI, Foreign Dept. Proceedings, Feb. 1911, Secret-External, Nos. 553-701, No. 583-C., C. 
A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department, the Nov, 15, 1910.
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Khangsar ponpo, known as Kongsa Tusi, at Karze attempted to head for Lhasa 
with some 300 people and priests.21
The story of Ngawan Jambel Rinchen at the Derge Kingdom is worth detailed 
account. He not only escaped to Lhasa following Zhao Erfeng’s invasion to Derge, 
but also flew to the British India together with the 13th Dalai Lama in February 
1910 when the Sichuan Army moved to Lhasa.22 Ngawan Jambel Rinchen behaved 
so not only because he was very much against Zhao Erfeng’s reform and the 
Han people, but also there were internal conflicts within the family over imperial 
succession since the end of the 19th century. Next is a letter from Ngawan to the 
Indian Governor Minto on March 15. This text is an important material for us to 
understand indigenous leaders’ political behavior against the backdrop of gaitu 
guiliu.
My country of Der-ge has been under the kind protection of the Chinese and 
Tibetans without getting any trouble. In the Earth-monkey year the Chinese 
official Chao Erh Feng came Der-ge. He did not consider the cause and effect 
of an action, but simply considered gold and silver. He sent soldiers and nearly 
killed me. Through the kindness of God I managed to escape. I have sought 
the protection of Dalai lama and am now in his service. ...... We have got a 
sanad from the Chinese Emperor Chienlung authorizing us to hold the country 
of Derge as long as the kalpa lasts i.e. forever. ...... As we could not perjure 
ourselves, we have been serving the Dalai lama so far. My father handed over 
to me the land and administration of Der-ge. My elder brother and the Chinese 
officials conspired together with an evil  intention and brought soldiers to Der-
ge. They attacked and destroyed the monastery of Ser-shul and Chao Erh feng 
and his soldiers annexed the country. (I request) that this may be now returned 
to me. ...... If the British government can punish him for taking much gold and 
silver and then conspiring with Chao, and for oppressing the people, I will serve 
the British Government as a child living in the same house serve his father23.
21 Qing found out about and prevented the attempted escape to Lhasa, and the female leader 
was caught. A report from Luxianxi to Zhao Erfeng concerning the Khangsar issue.Qing mo 
chuandian bianwu dacheng dang’an ziliao[The Archival Materials for Affairs of the Sichuan 
and Yunnan Frontier at the End of Qing Period] (abbreviate as CDBW) Xuantong year 2 May 5. 
no.0596 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book store, 1984).
22 Please refer to my work in footnote 19 about Derge Kingdom during the late Qing and early 
Republic era. 
23 IOR/L/P&S/10/149, P.2750, Tel. from C, A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, to the 
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Mar. 31, 1910. Unfortunately, 
the original text in Tibetan language does not exist today. Britain decided not to interfere in the 
Derge internal strife. NAI, Foreign Dept. Proceedings, Feb. 1911, Secret-External, Nos. 553-
701, No. 598, The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to 
C.A., Bell., Political Officer in Sikkim, Nov. 30, 1910.
Tibet in the Era of 1911 Revolutioin
100 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.3, No. 1
The last paragraph maintains that the Derge Kingdom had been under control 
of Qing and Dalai Lama’s government. This implies that the status of the Derge 
Kingdom during the Qing era is not a simple dichotomy of whether it is a “Tibetan 
territory” or a “Chinese territory” as will be discussed later about the confrontation 
between the Republic of China and the Dalai Lama’s government. I will also 
show that Ngawan Jambel Rinchen aimed to take advantage of support from the 
Dalai Lama’s government and Britain to regain power from his elder brother who 
ostracized him and seize the throne. These examples show that we need to analyze 
not only indigenous leaders’ ethnic identity, but also each of their interest in the 
power relations in the region so as to better understand their behavior rationale. 
The role of Tibetan merchants’ (who were indispensable in distant economic 
transactions among various places in Tibetan area) is also important for the 
analysis of the relationship between the then Dalai Lama’s government and 
Eastern Tibet. In particular, Pandatshang family at Markham of the west bank 
of the River of Golden Sand were successful in trading teas between Tibet and 
Han lands, controlling the key transportation area of Chamdo. The family grew 
to a huge business group after the end of the 19th century when the Britain-
Tibet trade began. They based their economic activities not only at Lhasa but 
also Kalimpong, Calcutta and other areas. What interesting here is that Panda 
Nyima Gyaltsen from this family played an important role in assisting the 13th 
Dalai Lama’s exile to India in 1910.24 In return, the Dalai Lama’s government 
granted Panda Nyima Gyaltsen an important position to conduct trade, including 
the exclusive rights to control sheep wool in northern Tibet. As a result, the 
family grew to become a powerful family that would occupy high positions in the 
Dalai Lama's Government as those aristocrats in central Tibet had enjoyed.25 The 
shifting international environment around Tibet brought about opportunities for 
new leaders, such as these elite trading groups, who are different from the priests 
and aristocrats supporting the government, to rise to the front stage. 
(2) Indigenous Leaders and the Republic of China and “The Republic
   of Five Races” 
The gaitu guiliu crackdown was harsh for indigenous leaders in Eastern Tibet. 
Some faced the situation with confrontation, others with conciliation, or exile 
to central Tibet, as the Derge Kingdom example illustrated earlier. On the other 
hand, many leaders succeeded in maintaining or recovering their power after 
24 NAI, Foreign Dept. Secret-External, June 1910, Nos. 276-550, Part A, No.480, Achoons 
Sering, Traffic Mohurir to W. M. Crawford, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Feb. 25, 1910.
25 Carole Mcgranahan. “Sa spang mda’ gnam spang mda’ : Murder, History, and Social Politics 
in 1920s Lhasa,” in Epstein, L. (ed.), Khams pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and 
Authority (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002).
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the Revolution and the retreat of the Qing armies. Some bowed to the newly 
established Republic of China. “the Republic of Five Races” was often thought 
to be the notion that helped to reconstruct the relationship between China and 
Tibetan people after the Revolution.26 However, this line of argument tends to 
downplay the behavior of the indigenous leaders. Although it is difficult to obtain 
first-hand materials, I would like to analyze the political behaviors of conciliatory 
indigenous leaders of Eastern Tibet, including their reaction to the “the Republic 
of Five Races” notion. 
Historical documents of the Republic specifically mentioned the Derge 
Kingdom and the Chala Kingdom, known as Mingzheng Tusi (which occupied 
Dartsemdo—a key area for Han-Tibet trade) as the indigenous leaders that 
declared obedience, as a result of the Sichuan Governor Yin Changheng’s invasion 
to Eastern Tibet in the summer of 1912.27 However, a report from Wilkinson—
British Consul at Chengdu to Hardinge—Governor-General of India on August 24 
maintains: 
  The King of Chala visited me on August 7th. He wore on his breast a gold 
medal given him by Yün tutu. He looked to be reinstated, though not in full. 
……The King wishes to re-build his palace in the city, while the tutu hopes to 
use him in the Tibetan Expedition28.
  The report shows that mutual interests in political and military agenda served 
as a basic background for Chala King’s obedience and Yin Changheng’s generous 
treatment. Based on his personal experiences of meeting Chala King, Louis King 
at the British Consul of Dartsedo maintains: 
Naturally enough, he was not in sympathy with democratic ideas, and deplored 
the change from Empire to Republic. ……He hoped that one day his kingdom 
would be restored to him-- that was the leit-motif of his life29.
  This passage shows that Chala King yielded to Yin Changheng not because 
he agreed to the idea of “the Republic of Five Races”, but in order to reclaim 
his status (taken away due to the gaitu guiliu) and rebuild his kingdom. In other 
words, during a quickly shifting era with the gaitu guiliu, the advent of the 
26 Yan Hu, “‘Wuzu gonghe’ kouhao de tichu jiqi yiyi” [The origin of “the Republic of Five 
Races” slogan and its implications] Xizang yanjiu [Tibet studies] (1995) 1.
27 “Yunchangheng dian zhengfu deng tusi chuli qingjiang” Mingguo Cangshi shiliao huibian 
vol.4 (Xuefan chubanshe, 2005), 10.
28 NAI, Foreign Dept. Proceedings, Feb. 1913, Secret-External, Nos. 170-509, No. 75, W. H. 
Wilkinson, Consulate-General, Chengtu to Harding, Viceroy of India, Aug. 24, 1912. 
29 King, L. M. China in Turmoil: Studies in Personality (London: H. Cranton, 1927), 98, 99.
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revolution, the establishment of the Republic and the arrival of Yin Changheng’s 
invading armies, indigenous leaders in Eastern Tibet were forced to take 
opportunistic moves so as to protect their own power bases. 
(3) Priests and Monasteries
Another interesting topic to consider when we try to analyze Tibetan people 
near the bordering areas during the Revolution would be the Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries and the monks there. In Tibet, monasteries are not only religious 
organization but also political authorities owning their lands and people. Many 
monks had the experiences of studying at the Lhasa Monastery, thereby enabling 
exchange of information and people within Tibet.30 The Monastic network 
between central Tibet and its periphery is very important, as it is clear from the 
fact that many tribes protested many times to Qing through the Dalai Lama’s 
government against Zhao Erfeng’s demolition and looting of the Eastern Tibetan 
monasteries.31
Yet, this does not mean that these Tibetan Buddhist monks and monasteries had 
acted as a monolith under the Dalai Lama’s government in the Revolution. One 
important example here would the behavior of reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries at Qinghai and Gansu. In 1912, Thukwan Hothogthu at the Qinghai 
Gonlung monastery wrote to Yuan Shikai, “I am truly respectful to the idea of 
‘the Republic of Five Races’ and all the five races live happily together in the 
Republic of China”. “Our Buddha also taught us that we should not discriminate 
people based on their classes, but bring salvation to everybody solely by learning 
the canon. The idea of ‘union’ indeed matches our Buddha’s teaching”.32 Thus, in 
reply to Yuan Shikai, he accepted “the Republic of Five Races”, likening the idea 
to Buddhism.
However, it would be foolhardy to accept Thukwan and other high-ranking 
priests’ behavior as literally maintained in this historical document. They may 
not have complied just because they were compassionate with the Republic’s 
integration principles. Although Thukwan’s original letter written in Tibetan is 
not found yet, Zangwen Baihua Bao (Tibetan colloquial magazine, issued by The 
Mongolia-Tibet Administrative Office), which served as a propaganda engine for 
Tibetan policies, published a Tibetan edition of the article, which was retranslated 
from the Chinese edition. There, “the Republic of Five Races” was translated as 
30 Regarding the connection among the Gelugpa Monasteries, refer to Yumiko Ishihama, 
Shinchou to chibetto bukkyo—bosatsuou to natta kenryu tei [The Qing Dynasty and The 
Tibetan Buddhist World—the Qianlong Emperor who became Bodhisattva] (Tokyo: Waseda 
University Press, 2011), Chapter 4. 
31 For instance, the letter from the Ganden Tipa to Zhao Erfeng, July 2, 1908, CDBW, 
No.0197.
32 The petition from Thukwan to the president、December 10, 1912, ZDLDXZ, No.18.
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“The Kongho consists of all the people of the five races” (rigs lnga’i mi thams cad 
gcig tu ’dus pa’i kong ho).33 The Kongho is obviously a transliteration of Gonghe 
showing “republic” in Chinese, not a technical term in Tibetan. It is extremely 
doubtful that Thukwan or the readers of the magazine (such as Tibetan Buddhist 
monks and Tibetan indigenous leaders) accepted the idea that they were destined 
to jointly build a country with the Hans and Muslims who did not share the 
Tibetan Buddhism.34
We should pay attention to the continuity of policies from Qing to Yuan Shikai 
if we want to analyze the behavior of high-ranking priests from the Amdo region, 
namely Qinghai and Gansu. As one of its Tibetan Buddhist policies, Qing had 
conferred many statuses and titles to Tibetan Buddhist monks ever since the 17th 
century. Those from Qinghai and Gansu were assigned with particularly important 
positions. For instance, beginning with the grant of Daguoshi (The title of Great 
State Preceptor) to Changkya Hothogthu centered at Gonlon Monastery, many 
reincarnations have became the high ranking officials in the Qing Dynasty.35
In fact, Yuan Shikai seems to have succeeded many institutes and policies 
of Qing’s Tibetan policies. First, Thukwan received the “Jingxiu Chanshi” title 
and rewards in silver on December 21, 1912, just as he did in the Qing era.36 On 
October 19, Yuan offered Changkya Hothogthu “Hongji guangming daguoshi”, 
the same title from Qing. Bka’ ’gyur ba ho thog thu, who was also from Qinghai, 
also received his title.37  In addition, Yuan also decided to grant changkya 10,000 
Yuan per year around the same time.38 Thus, Yuan attempted to assimilate high-
ranking priests to his regime by protecting their statuses and monetary resources 
that they had enjoyed since Qing. Obviously, this is not just about the Republic’s 
political manipulation of the priests. The same also applies to the priests. They 
33 The petition from Thukwan to the government of Republic China, Zangwenbaihuabao 
[Tibetan Colloquial Magazine] (Jan 1913) no.1.
34 Based on his analyses of the biography of the 6th Panchen Lama (who escaped to China in 
1923) and other documents, Gray Tuttle concludes that Panchen Lama did not share and under-
stand the idea of “Five Races under One Union”. Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhism in the Making 
of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 143-146. Regarding the audi-
ence, its penetration and influences of Zangwen baihua bao [Tibetan colloquial paper], refer 
to Yuxin Zhang, “‘Zang wen baihua bao’ lueshu” [A brief introduction about Zang wen baihua 
bao] Zang wen baihua bao, .3.
35 Yoko Kurimoto, (2009) “Yosei nenkan no shinchou ni yoru chankya sansei shousei no keii 
to sono igi” [Qing’s invitation of Changkya 3rd during the Yongzheng Era and its implication] 
Shijing [History territory] 58.
36 The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs department’s address to Thukwan. December 25, 1912, 
ZDLDXZ, Vol.2, No. 20.
37 The staff department’s address to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs department, March 13, 
1913, ZDLDXZ, Vol.2, No.32.
38 Miao Zhou ed. Meng zang fojiao shi [The history of Buddhism in Mongolia and Tibet] 
(Jiangsu: Guangling guji keyin she, 1994), 115, 116.
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were consciously aware of political changes within the Tibetan Buddhist sphere, 
such the advent of the Bogd Khaan regime and the collapse of Qing. We should 
pay attention to their efforts in establishing and maintaining their authority against 
this context.39 Therefore, to understand the rationale of priests’ compliance with 
the Republic, we have to analyze not only Yuan Shikai’s carrot policy, but also its 
relationship with high-ranking priests’ intentions and the general background.
 
3. The Simla Conference and Territorial Problems 
As maintained earlier, the politics across the borderlands with the Hans had 
exhibited many behaviors during the political changes of the revolutionary 
era when the Dalai Lama’s government and China gradually headed toward 
confrontation. Yet, the only political entity that received international recognition 
was the Dalai Lama’s government. It was against this backdrop that the Tibet 
representative headed to the trilateral conference at Simla. 
Simla Conference could be traced back to the memorandum that Jordan—
Envoy to Beijing, submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
China on August 17, 1912, requiring signing a new agreement about Tibet. The 
memorandum stated British understanding of Tibet’s political status. As many 
researchers argue, the content of this memo set the basic policy orientation for 
Britain to draw the draft for the Simla Conference. While recognizing China’s 
suzerain rights over Tibet, the document elucidates that Tibet maintains the rights 
for its own domestic affairs, thereby rejecting the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet 
ever since the Qing Dynasty.40
The British side, however, remained undecided over one crucial issue when it 
was drafting the memorandum, i.e., the definition of the exact territory of Tibet 
under the Dalai Lama’s government. Meanwhile, the Republic of China, Britain 
and the Dalai Lama’s government all had (or were about to have) their own 
understandings of the territory of “Tibet”, and this perceptual gap was about to 
surface in the Simla Conference among the three parties. 
The Tibetan representative Shatra Penjol Dorjie demanded that the territory 
should be based on Tang-Fan huimeng bei (The treaty between Tang and Tibet 
during the first half of the eighth century) and its contents. The area would 
encompass almost all the Tibetan resident territories including Kham and Amdo 
(see map 1). In addition, he presented many materials that show the historical 
relationship between the Dalai Lama’s government and other indigenous leaders 
39 Bulag, U. E. Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China’s Mongolian 
Frontier (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 71-73.
40 Alastair Lamb, op. cit., 426-506.
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and monasteries, arguing for territorial unity with the Dalai Lama’s government at 
the center.
As maintained in the second section of this paper, the Dalai Lama’s government 
had approved the coexistence or overlap of its authority and power with that of 
Qing over the bordering areas with the Han people. This makes it all the more 
significant that the government changed its attitude to exclusive authority over 
these areas soon after the collapse of Qing. For the government, it was the first 
time for it to clearly illustrate its own territory at an international conference. 
Thus, it is important that we analyze the government’s territorial perception from 
the modern concept of “national border”. 
In addition to analyzing the ideational shift in territory and dominance, we 
should also consider the actual crisis that the Dalai Lama’s government faced 
at that time. Let us not forget that the Dalai Lama’s government was fighting 
squarely with the Sichuan Armies in Eastern Tibet at the time. From the letters 
(mostly only in English translations) that the Dalai Lama’s government sent to 
Indian government between January 1913 when the 13th Dalai Lama returned to 
Lhasa to October when the Simla Conference took place, we could notice that the 
Dalai Lama’s government expected British recognition of its political status as 
well as support to ward off the Chinese armies from Eastern Tibet. 
For instance, the 13th Dalai Lama sent a private letter to Hardinge, Governor-
General of India amidst the conference on July 24, maintaining, “The great British 
Government, being the only hope Tibet, will very kindly see that the Chinese 
officers and soldiers are withdrawn from the Tibetan territory of Kham, and that 
they are not permitted again to come to Tibet by false pretention as before.” Thus, 
the issue was of the 13th Dalai Lama’s central concern at the Simla Conference.41 
The then Dalai Lama’s government had to set the Sino-Tibetan border as far away 
as possible so as to exclude the Sichuan Armies at Eastern Tibet and permanently 
keep China’s influence at bay. Thus, upon the conference, it carefully prepared for 
historical proofs of its de facto dominance of the border area.
In contrast, the Chinese representative Chen Yifan argued for continuing 
domination of the territory since Zhao Erfeng at the end of Qing period. Zhao 
had mobilized his armies, cutting much deeper across the two ends of Sichuan 
borders. Zhao’s successor Fu Songmu, the Border Commissioner for Sichuan and 
Yunnan—advised the Emperor to establish Xikang province in Eastern Tibet on 
August 10, 1911.42 The suggestion was made just three months before the outburst 
41 NAI, Foreign Dept. External-B, Nov. 1913, Nos. 283-286, Letters and Presents from His 
Highness the Dalai Lama to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary, dated 
Simla, Oct. 6, 1913.
42 Fu Songmu’s address to the throne regarding establishment of Xikang Xingsheng (June 16, 
Xuantong year 3), CDBW, no. 0934.
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of the Revolution, and it was never approved from the central government. On the 
other hand, within the Republican government, more and more people came to 
share the view that, instead of leaving them to Tibet, China should annex the areas 
all the way to Jomda, which Zhao’s army had arrived and stationed. Thus, the 
Sichuan Army did not completely halt its campaigns in Eastern Tibet even with 
diplomatic pressures from the British government, and neither did Chen Yifan 
easily compromise over this issue at the conference (see figure. 1-⑥).43
What attitude did the British government take as an arbiter at the conference 
regarding the diverging views between the two plenipotentiaries? Yet, neither 
Shatra’s nor Chen Yifan’s contention drastically influenced the British calculation 
over border delineation. Prior to the conference, the British side started to draw 
the agreement draft based on the memorandum as mentioned earlier. It states: The 
draft basically determined the range of “Tibet” as the Dalai Lama’s government 
enjoyed its autonomy. 
For the purposes of the present agreement, Thibet shall be held to include the 
districts of Za-yul, Mar-kham, Draya, Chiamdo, Gyade, and Nagchuka, and all 
country lying south and west of the Tang-la Range.44
This area coincides with the autonomous “Tibet” (“outer Tibet” as will be 
mentioned later), which was presented at the last stage of border negotiation at 
Simla Conference. Before the conference, the British side had already decided its 
bottom line to compromise vis-à-vis the Chinese counterpart as to the basic range 
of the autonomous “Tibet”. 
The British government was mostly concerned with how to contain the 
Chinese political and military influence at the border area of Tibet next to the 
northeast region of the British India. At the crossroad of Assam, Tibet and north 
Burma, Zayul was a particularly important region for British security as Zhao 
Erfeng’s army once arrived at the region in late Qing and the threat of Sichuan 
Army’s entrance after the establishment of the Republic had always lingered.45 
Meanwhile, India’s position on border delineation was based on Charles Bell, 
an intermediate with the Dalai Lama’s government as mentioned earlier. In 
December 1912, Charles Bell included in the fifth article that “Tibet” should be an 
“prohibited area” of Chinese forces. The integration of Markham on the west bank 
43 Regarding Chen Yifan’s change of attitudes regarding border delineation negotiation, see 
Mingzhu Feng, Jindai zhong ying Xizang jiaoshe yu chuanzang bianqing [Modern negotiation 
among China, Britain and Tibet, and the Tibet border areas] (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 
1996), 328-39.
44 FO371/1610, 10751, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Tibet, encl. in India 
Office to Foreign Office, Mar. 7, 1913.  
45 Alastair Lamb, op. cit., 459-460.
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of the Golden Sand River was considered especially important to secure Zayul 
right behind Markham.46 This suggestion concurs with the border area between 
Markham and Batang delineated during the Yongzheng era. In addition, it was 
also compatible with British line to contain China’s influence on Tibet at the pre 
1904 level when the New Policies was yet to begin in Tibet.47
However, this policy on border issue had to be reconsidered after the 
conference. First, the differences between the representatives from Tibet and 
China were extremely wide. The British representative Henry McMahon 
presented the agreement draft to both representatives from Britain and Tibet on 
February 17, 1914. In order to seek a common ground between the two sides, the 
draft suggested a compromise plan dividing Tibet to “Outer Tibet” under the Dalai 
Lama’s government and “Inner Tibet” that function as a buffer zone against the 
Chinese mainland (see fig. 1- ② and ④ ). This way of dividing shows that the 
British side particularly heeded to the Tibetans who brought in many materials to 
make their point to claim the border territories. The British side was considering 
the following policies: 1). To introduce a “Inner Tibet” with its borders closely 
46 FO371/1609, 3189, Telegram P., No. 235S, from The Political officer, Sikkim, to the Foreign 
Secretary, Delhi, dated Dec. 22, 1912.
47 FO371/1609, 3357, India Office to Foreign Office, Jan. 21, 1913.
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along the peripheries of “Tibet” as the Tibetan representative claims; 2). To 
recognize the Dalai Lama’s government’s de facto dominance of Nyarong and 
Derge during the late 19th century and annex them to “Outer Tibet”; 3). To grant 
the Dalai Lama’s government the power to not only administers religious issues of 
the “Inner Tibet”, but also authority over wide range of issues including taxation, 
and appointment and dismissal of bureaucrats.48
British intentions are clear from its policy of “Inner Tibet”, which neither 
recognizes China’s de facto dominance of the region, nor incorporate the area 
into the Dalai Lama’s “autonomous” govetnment. First, worried about China’s 
military actions at Eastern Tibet even during the conference, McMahon attempted 
to more effectively prevent Chinese influence by forming “Inner Tibet” as a buffer 
zone. The Britain was also uneasy about Russia’s possible strengthening of its 
presence through Mongolia, as a result of changes in international politics such as 
the Russo-Mongolian Treaty and the Mongolia-Tibet Treaty. Thus, Britain thought 
it necessary to introduce a border zone that partially admits China’s control in 
order to avoid direct contacts between the autonomous Tibet and Mongolia. While 
looking for a common ground as the arbitrator, the Britain was consistent in its 
geopolitical position in reconstructing the regional order mainly by protecting 
India.49
Thus, all three actors participated in the negotiation of border issue, with 
different ideas of the territory of “Tibet”. Regarding the settlement, Britain was 
able to secure an agreement from Tibet, who needed London as a counterweight 
against China. However, the Chinese did not agree, and only the British and the 
Tibetan representatives signed the July 3 draft. In other words, the negotiation 
failed, as the three parties were unable to reach agreement over border delineation. 
These regions remained key areas for Sino-Tibetan relations throughout the first 
half of the 20th century, fraught with conflict of interests among warlords and 
Tibetan indigenous leaders. 
48 Yifan Chen deleted the part that stipulated the authority of tax collection and appointment of 
bureaucrats. “1914nian 4yue 15 ri: Chen Yifan yu Lou Shi huitan beiwanglu” [April 15, 1914 
the interview between Chen Yifan and Rose] Waijiaobu dangan zhuanshu Jiewulei di wu ce—
Xizang juan 1 [Archive collection of the ministry of foreign affairs volume 5 of border issues 
–Tibet 1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed., (2005) no. 009.
49 FO371/1931, 43390, Jul. 23, 1914, Final Memorandum. In this regard, this is different from 
the “Inner Mongolia” and “Outer Mongolia” differentiation appeared during the Qing era. 
Junko Miyawaki, Mongoru no rekishi [The history of Mongolia] (Tokyo: Tousui shobo, 2003), 
222-25. 
109
Conclusion
During the political upheavals of Qing’s demise and establishment of the 
Republic, two issues regarding Tibet emerged. One was its political status. The 
other was the concrete boundary of “Tibet”, which awaits to be unified. What 
could be made clear about the then Tibet through the analysis of its territorial 
issue? 
Until the 19th century, Qing and the Dalai Lama’s government basically 
maintained a friendly relationship. Although sometimes tensions existed between 
the two, the Qing emperors worshipped and protected Tibetan Buddhism. Both 
were able to exert authority and power in the bordering regions such as Eastern 
Tibet, and neither aimed to establish exclusive dominance at the expense of the 
other. However, as a result of its changing national structures after the second 
half of the 19th century, Qing changed its policy and attempted to assimilate 
Tibet under its sovereignty. Sino-Tibet relations collapsed during this process of 
the New policies. Thus, territorial issues of Tibet originate from Qing’s domestic 
transformation and (often military) confrontation between the two sides. Soon they 
developed into disputes over border delineation, added with British interferences. 
On the hand, although it is less obvious from the level of international 
politics, many polities in the disputed areas exhibited diverse political behaviors. 
Ethnicity and political ideologies of the Republic do not suffice to account for 
these different political decisions. These policy lines ought to be understood in 
terms of multiple factors, including the suppressive New policies particularly at 
the end of Qing Dynasty, historical relations between Qing and the Dalai Lama’s 
government, power distribution among indigenous leaders, and the religious and 
economic network that goes beyond such indigenous localities within Tibet. 
Obviously, this paper does not intend to emphasize the lack of unity within 
the then Tibet by discussing its inner diversity. Rather, no fixated conceptual 
framework can explain the political behaviors of these polities during the 
revolution era, for these behaviors reflect the complex relations between “China” 
and “Tibet”. The bilateral relationship consists of many components that are fully 
exhibited during the historical processes of the bordering regions. These regions 
were not under constant confrontation for territorial enlargement since the Qing 
era. Whereas Tibetan Buddhists in Qinghai and Gansu played important roles in 
Qing’s Tibetan Buddhism policies, indigenous leaders of Sichuan—Tusi supported 
the transportation between Qing and Tibet. These leaders and Monks were 
intermediaries between the two powers. As such, they acted in a way that was 
quite different from the administration on a territorial basis, characterizing their 
diverse political behavior patterns in the revolution period. 
During the political processes of border delineation, many characteristics of 
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the Buddhism based Qing-Tibet relationship had been either ignored or treated as 
bargaining chips of the negotiation. However, in order to realize the reason why 
the boundary problem continued to haunt the relationship of the Dalai Lama’s 
government with China after the Simla Conference, we have to pay attention to 
the historical relationship between “Tibet” and “China” and its transformation 
cannot be understood in the modern context of territorial control. Furthermore, the 
territorial issue had always been connected with the question of Tibet’s political 
status even after the assimilation of Tibet to the People’s Republic. The issues 
about “Tibet” during the 1911 Revolution as treated in this article have to be 
analyzed as the origins of the disputes.
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